I have to answer the following prompt questions and will upload the readings.

Robbins et al.’s short article “Developing the commons: The contradictions of growth in exurban Montana” uses common property regime theory (as well as political economy) to understand growth regulation in Montana, where development profits depend on ecological integrity and “natural” beauty, but development itself also threatens those things.

I want you to think about the case described in the article in more specific relation to Ostrom’s CPR theories than the article did itself. To address the following prompt, I suggest you revisit Ostrom’s “design principles” for CFPs (table 3.1, on pg. 90 of the Ostrom reading from last week).

1 – In what ways does Park County’s development regime resemble a “long-enduring CPR institution” structured by one or more of Ostrom’s design principles?

2 – Are there any notable differences between Ostrom’s principles and the system that has developed in Park County, that might help to explain its limits and/or its instability?

Pose 2 questions about the Montana case, or another natural resources/environmental conflict you are interested in, motivated by the “environmental conflict thesis” Paul Robbins presents in Chapter 10 of Political Ecology. Particularly useful starting points include the propositions Robbins introduces under the section titled “The Argument,” on pages 200 – 203.